

# Clarifying the power and limitation of CyberAttacks with Adversarial Examples




Fig.1. A small change imperceptible to humans misleads the InceptionV3 network into classifying an image of a tabby cat as guacamole. Image taken from

<https://github.com/anishathalye/obfuscated-gradients>.

WAIS2020 Feb. 21<sup>st</sup>

## Clarifying on the power and limitation of CyberAttacks with Adversarial Examples



88% **tabby cat**

adversarial  
perturbation →



99% **guacamole**

Fig.1. A small change imperceptible to humans misleads the InceptionV3 network into classifying an image of a tabby cat as guacamole. Image taken from

<https://github.com/anishathalye/obfuscated-gradients>.



WAIS2020 東京理科大 葛飾 FEB.21ST

## Clarifying the power and limitation of CyberAttacks with Adversarial Examples



Adi Shamir Join AI-Research 2019  
**With Combinatorial Geometry**  
to discuss the power of machine  
learning

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ATR：適応コミュニケーション研究所 先端セキュリティ研究室

# Background

It is time for cryptographers 🙄  
and cybersecurity-researchers 🤪  
to do study AI 🤖


- Today's talk

- Introduction : Shamir's recent approach to clarification of adversarial example attack
- **“One pixel attack for fooling deep neural networks”**
  - My recent great success result





# The Insecurity of Machine Learning: Problems and Solutions



## 1. ESORICS2019

One of Three KeyNotes

- Sept.23<sup>rd</sup>
- Luxembourg
- PC-chair by Sako(NEC)



## 0. [arxiv.org/abs/1901.10861](https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.10861)

**(Submitted on 30 Jan 2019)**

**Simple Explanation for the Existence of Adversarial  
Examples with Small Hamming Distance**

*Adi Shamir, Itay Safran, Eyal Ronen, Orr Dunkelman*

**!! 著者順に注意を!! @google-scholar 引用はまだ9件**

scis2020高知

## 2. 理研 Center for AIP

Special Lecture

- 2019. 12月3日
- 日本橋

# Shamir's targeted attacks

[ 11 pixel 100% success but "10" pixel fail ]

The same set of 11 pixels could be modified to change the original decision 7 to any other decision  
(red=decreased value, green=increased value)




# Machine Learning with Big Data@Adi. SHAMIR


## My goal in this talk:

- ♦ To develop a simple mathematical framework which will enable us to look at the problem from a new perspective
- ♦ To show that this baffling phenomenon is actually a natural consequence of the geometry of high dimensional spaces
- ♦ Based on joint work with Itay Safran, Eyal Ronen, and Orr Dunkelman

2019 09 23




Shamir's Piecewise-Linear map from MNIST to the the classification : [0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]



**Note: Shamir's experience is the most simple and not exactly deep: ANN with just one hidden layer.**



# Theory and Experiment by Shamir

- DNN:  $R^n \rightarrow R^m$  : Piecewise Linear (with ReLU)
  - $(n \gg m)$ : MNIST has  $(n=784, m=10)$
- L0-norm (Hamming Distance) [L2-case is unsolved]
- Combinatorial Geometry (confirmed Prof. E. Bannai)
  - T. Zaslavsky, “Facing up to Arrangements: Face-Count Formulas for Partitions of Space by Hyperplanes”, (1975)
  - N. Alon, P. Frankl, V. Rodl “GEOMETRICAL REALIZATION OF SET SYSTEMS AND PROBABILISTIC COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY” (1985)
- Design searching algorithm
  - Swap  $m$ -bit  $\rightarrow (m+1)$ -bit
  - Experimental techniques against soft error





The main trick: get each straight line segment in the output space by changing only  $m$  input variables:



Notice:  $x$  and  $y$  are very different,  
 $x$  and  $z$  are very similar, but  $y$  and  $z$   
are classified the same by the DNN

2019 09 23

# Consequences from Shamir

- CONJECTORE: applicable to abt DNN with Peicewise Linear
- Limitation of DNN
  - No use of increasing the number of layer nor complexing the structure, if they are piecewise linear
- Some networks has non piecewise linear
  - [Osadchy et al. “No Bot Expects the DeepCAPTCHA! Introducing Immutable Adversarial Examples, With Applications to CAPTCHA Generation. IEEE Trans. 2017. ]  
medium filter with not continuous
  - If this, Shamir’s attack cannot work....

In many cases, it suffices to make the smallest possible change:

- ◆ A paper published in November 2017 by Su Jiawei and colleagues at Kyushu University found that changing one pixel in about 74% of the test images made the neural nets wrongly label what they saw

[九大2017.Nov]

蘇(現・KDDI-Lab)-VARGAS-櫻井  
One-pixel Attack



Airplane (Dog)




Automobile (Dog)



Automobile  
(Airplane)



Cat (Dog)



Dog (Ship)



Deer (Dog)



Frog (Dog)



Frog (Truck)



Dog (Cat)



Bird (Airplane)



Horse (Cat)  
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Ship (Truck)



Horse  
(Automobile)



Dog (Horse)



Ship (Truck)

Su, J., Vasconcellos Vargas, D.,  
and Kouichi, S. (◀ 氏名が逆)  
One pixel attack for fooling deep  
neural networks.  
arXiv:1710.08864, 2017.

# One pixel attack examples(2)



Airplane	Automobile	Bird
Cat	Deer	Frog
Horse	Ship	Truck

Target classes

Original image (dog)

One image can be simultaneously perturbed to nine other classes.



# One-Pixel Attack(3)

- 2019. Jan
  - IPSJ Transactions on Computer Vision and Applications
    - "Attacking convolutional neural network using differential evolution"
  - IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation  
( Early Access )
    - "One Pixel Attack for Fooling Deep Neural Networks"
    - Cite by **428** papers @google scholar 2020.Jan.30 (→ 447 today)
- 2018 Mar.
  - Keynote [ICT.OPEN/NL](#)
- 2018 Feb. Rejected by CVPR



# ICT.OPEN [2018 Mar, Amersfoort, NL]

- INVITED “ Power and limitation of Adversarial Machine Learning and their consequences
- Three Questions





- **One is on why One-Pixel-Attack happen !**

- From Dr. Sheng HE [贺胜] (Univ. Groningen)
    - Because of the characteristic of Activate function !!
    - Change ReLU to SIGMOID !!!

# Shapes of Activations (SIGMOID vs ReLU)

Limited

Not Limited



Non-decreasing

J. Su, D. V. Vargas, K. Sakurai

**“Empirical Evaluation on Robustness of Deep Convolutional Neural Networks Activation Functions Against Adversarial Perturbation”**

**CANDAR workshop 2018**

Dear Prof. Sakurai Kouichi,  
Thanks very much for your nice work and paper.  
It looks like that Sigmoid can protect  
the one-pixel attack, in somehow.

Another solution, might replace the max-pooling  
with the median-pooling, liking the median filter  
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Median\\_filter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Median_filter)).

The position of one-pixel attack and the corresponding wrong class  
is also very interesting to investigate.

Again, thanks for your invitation for the co-author.

However, I did not do anything about your paper,  
so I think I am not deserved.

Good luck and best wishes!                      Sheng



# Professional AI-research ?

- I would-be expert



**→ Don't just believe it, you have to think about it**



**—Everybody enjoy AI-research !**



[GitHAB2019.Jan]

Keras implementation of "OPA" using  
differential evolution on Cifar10 and  
ImageNet

- Open Source
- His result shows our OPA is not  
so good performance as  
experimented in our IEEE Trans.






# Recent results around OPA

- 2019.Feb. by D.V.Vargas and J.Su
  - Understanding the One-Pixel Attack:  
Propagation Maps and Locality Analysis
- 2019.June, MIT-researchers
  - **“Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, TheyAre Features”**  
addresses adversarial examples by removing "non-robust"
    - Features from the training data to only include "human-obvious" features, and shows that algorithms trained on it are more robust against attacks introducing additional features:

It is time for cryptographers  
and cybersecurity-researchers  
to do study AI



**Now with AI-research**

**Join or Perish**



# BEYOND YOUR ACCADEMIC DISCIPLINE



- CRYPTOGRAPHY



- MATHEMATICS



- CYBERSECURITY



- ARTIFICIAL  
INTELLIGENCE





# Our Happy News from Adi. Shamir

- Mathematics now/easy to go into AI-research
- Combinatorial Geometry
  - Linear Algebra
  - Discrete Probability
  - ~ APPROXIMATION



# Any questions or comments/opinions ?



<http://www.escherinhetpaleis.nl/foto>

EZWD20772



# one-pixel attack(そのI) [蘇-Vargas-櫻井2017]

1. 2017/10/24: Arxivへ論文を投稿し公開発表  
著者: Su, Vargas, and Sakurai
2. 2017/10/30 MIT Tech Review review でArxiv論文が紹介される:  
“How Do You Turn a Dog into a Car? Change a Single Pixel”.
3. 2017/11/02: Su宛にBBC記者から当該論文に関する質問eメール
4. 2017.11/03: BBC e-Newsに掲載される  
“Computers can be fooled into thinking a picture of a taxi is a dog just by changing one pixel, suggests research”
5. 2018/01/10 朝日新聞社より、櫻井宛に、当該論文に関する問い合わせのemailが届き、数回の説明と解説を行う。
6. 2018/01/19 朝日新聞朝刊コラムに研究の引用と下名のコメントが掲載  
%未報道: 2018/01/17にも、下名宛にNHK報道局科学文化部から電話で問い合わせあり、emailにて回答。  
%% O大の分散計算(Dependability)も知っていた(2018.10)

[GitHAB2019.Jan]

Keras implementation of "OPA" using  
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- Open Source
- His result shows our OPA is not  
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